Financiamiento ilegal: una realidad a las sombras en las campañas presidenciales del Ecuador. Caso Sobornos (2012 2016)

Abstract

Abstract: This research analyzes how illegal financing in politics, especially in presidential campaigns, has affected democratic quality in Ecuador, specifically focusing on the "Bribes 2012-2016" case ruling. Through the analysis of this process, it was concluded that parallel structures and triangulation existed through the cross-invoicing of bills, which favored certain economic groups, who were able to obtain public resolutions in exchange for contributions. This analysis is conducted using the analytical categories of vertical and horizontal accountability and the quality of democracy, with a theoretical approach encompassing legitimacy and public trust, systemic corruption, state capture, and institutional failure. The research argues that these practices were not isolated errors, but rather the result of regulatory gaps that facilitated state capture. Operating outside official accounting, these resources distorted fairness at the polls and eliminated the transparency necessary for citizen oversight. Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates that the financial manipulation of campaigns weakened accountability mechanisms, thus justifying the proposal of urgent reforms to prevent political power from being mortgaged to private interests in future electoral processes.